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Interstate Arrangement for the Determination and
Payment of Interstate Claims-An Experiment
in Interstate Cooperation*
SIDNEY EDELMANt'
The recent publicity given to individuals who claim unemploy-
ment compensation after having left the State in which their rights
were earned to move to resort areas, such as Florida or California,
has tended to ignore and obscure very real questions connected with
the interstate payment of unemployment compensation." Upon
what basis can an individual who leaves a State file a claim for
compensation under the law of such State? How is such claim to
be transmitted and determined?
Whether or not an individual is entitled to unemployment com-
pensation requires a quasi-judicial determination by the unemploy-
ment compensation agency. Collecting the facts which form the
basis of such a determination is often difficult when the individual
has left the State under whose law his rights are determined. The
necessities of the situation have called forth cooperative efforts on
the part of all the States to devise procedures and methods calcu-
lated to assure the prompt payment of interstate benefits when due.
As may be expected, these procedures and methods have been the
subject of revision and experimentation. This article is concerned
primarily with the latest approach to the payment of interstate
benefits, the Interstate Arrangement for the Determination and
Payment of Interstate Claims.
* The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and are not in-
tended to reflect the official views of the Federal Security Agency or of the
Social Security Administration.
11 Senior Attorney, Federal Security Agency.
" It should be noted, in passing, that these transient workers are not
necessarily vacationing. During the winter season the milder climates offer
much greater opportunity for employment, in many fields, than exist in the
North. The Winter, for example, is the boom period for construction work in
Florida, and a claimant who moves to Florida at that time may merely be
going where work in his occupation is available. Moreover, as pointed out
below, in order to be entitled to unemployment compensation, interstate claim-
ants must meet all the eligibility requirements and are subject to all the dis-
qualification provisions of the State law involved.
Of the 2,785,159 claims filed for unemployment compensation under the
Ohio law in the 18 month period beginning April 1, 1947, and ending September
20, 1948, 26,288, or a little less than 1% of all claims, were filed by interstate
claimants (1,588 of these interstate claims originated in Florida and 3,930 in
California). The nation-wide proportion of interstate claims for the same
period averaged about 4%. In the first quarter of 1948, for example, of
10,771,423 payments of unemployment compensation 497,213, or 4.6%, were
interstate payments.
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At the present time, 18 State unemployment compensation
agencies' have entered into the Interstate Arrangement for the
Determination and Payment of Interstate Claims.2 As its name
implies, the Arrangement is designed to establish procedures for
the payment of unemployment compensation to claimants who have
left the State where they earned the wages on which their benefits
are based.3 The Arrangement, which is still in an experimental
stage, exists side by side with the older Interstate Benefit Payment
Plan, and payments of unemployment compensation to interstate
claimants are now made under both the Arrangement and the plan.
Prior to a detailed discussion of the Arrangement, a brief descrip-
tion of the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan, which it was designed
to supersede, will be helpful to an understanding of the forces which
impelled the creation and adoption of the Arrangement.
I. THE INTERSTATE BENEFIT PAYMENT PLAN
4
The Social Security Act5 created a "federal-state" system of
unemployment compensation. Under the inducement of the Federal
act, it was contemplated that the States would, as they did, enact
'As of March 1, 1949, the following States had entered into the Arrange-
ment: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Territory of Hawaii, Idaho,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The remaining
State agencies are either not desirous of entering into the Arrangement, or
have concluded that their laws do not permit their subscribing to it. Ohio has
not subscribed to the Arrangement.
-While the writer has herein considered only this Arrangement and the
Interstate Benefit Payment Plan, there are other interstate agreements, some
of which are for the protection of claimants and others of which are for the
convenience of employers. For example, there is a wage-combining agreement
under which a claimant who has earned wages in more than one State but
has not earned enough wages in any State to be eligible for benefits may, by
a combination of his wage credits, receive benefits (see I CCH, U.I.Serv.
Treatise, §2050). There is also a reciprocal coverage arrangement under
which an employer whose employees work in more than one State may elect
to cover such employees under the law of one of such States and file only a
single return and make his contributions to only one State (see I CCH, U.I.Serv.
Treatise, §§ 1384 et seq.)
'Hereafter referred to as an interstate claimant. An individual who files
his claim for benefits in the State in which his wages were earned is hereafter
referred to as an intrastate claimant.
The terms of the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan are set out in full in
Section 2050.01, of the Treatise in I, CCH (Unemployment Insurance Service).
All States, including the 18 which have subscribed to the Arrangement, are
participating in the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan. The States which have
adopted the Arrangement are thus paying benefits under the Plan, to claim-
ants from States which have not adopted the Arrangement, as well as under
the Arrangement.
549 STAT. 626 (1935), 46 U.S.C. § 88a (1946); 53 STAT. 1378 (1939, 42
U.S.C. § 502, 503 (1946).
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and administer their own unemployment compensation laws.' Gen-
erally, these State laws provide that an unemployed individual is
entitled to receive payments of unemployment compensation for a
limited period if he has filed a claim for such compensation, has
earned sufficient wages in employment subject to the law, has met
other conditions of eligibility, and is not disqualified for statutorily
prescribed conduct. The amount of benefits, subject to provisions
on minimum and maximum payments, is directly related to the
amount of wages credited to the individual.
The Interstate Benefit Payment Plan was designed to ameliorate
a difficulty inherent in the treatment by 51 separate unemployment
compensation systems of a problem essentially national in scope.
Early in the program7 it was apparent that some standardized pro-
cedure must be adopted to insure payment of benefits to individuals
who become non-residents of the State where their wage credits
were earned. To insist that a worker apply in person to a local
office in his home State would obviously impose an oppressive and
expensive burden on a claimant who has moved to another State
and is seeking employment there .
7
Recognizing this need, the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan
was devised to provide that a claimant may file a claim for benefits
' Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). For a brief dis-
cussion of the role of the Social Security Act in securing the enactment of
State unemployment compensation laws, see Witte, Developrent of Unemploy-
mcat Conzpensaton, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 32 et seq.
I In May 1938, a plan adopted by the Interstate Benefit Payment Committee
of the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies was distributed
for acceptance and subsequently adopted by all States.
" A contrary result would, in effect, penalize the worker who left the State
in which his wage credits were earned and would result in restricting the
mobility of labor. The unemployment compensation law was never intended
to be used for such a purpose. For example, Section 1345-19, Ohio General
Code, which authorizes the Administrator of the Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation to enter into the reciprocal arrangements with government agen-
cies is evidence that the legislature intended that workers who left the State of
Ohio might, nevertheless, be entitled to benefits under the Ohio law. Cf. Brown-
Brockmeyer Co. v. Holmes, 84 N.E. 2d 290 (Ohio 1949), where the Montgomery
County Court of Appeals held that the term "residence" as used in section
1346-6-e(3), which provides that an individual shall not be disqualified for
refusing work located at an unreasonable distance from his residence, refers
to the person's established residence at the time the work is offered. Therefore,
an individual who left his job in Ohio to move to California where he estab-
lished a residence was held not to be disqualified for benefits during his subse-
quent unemployment for refusing re-employment offered by his former Ohio
employer. The holding in this case implicitly recognizes that a State unem-
ployment compensation law is not intended to provide benefits only for those
individuals who remain in the State, and results in encouraging workers to
move to other areas where work may be available without fear of losing their
rights to unemployment compensation under the Ohio law.
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in a State other than that in which his wages were earned and have
his right to benefits determined under the law of the latter State.
Under this procedure, the State receiving the claim (the agent
State) forwards it for determination and payment to the State in
which the claimant's wages were earned, the paying (liable) State.
Provisions for appeals and hearings are included in the plan, which
is in the form of interstate compacts," pledging the adherence of
all participating State agencies.
Insofar as the plan furnished a positive procedure it was suc-
cessful, as evidenced by the number of claims handled under it.
"From 4 to 10 per cent of the benefits paid each quarter since 1940
have been paid to interstate claimants. In some States the percent-
age of weeks compensated to interstate claimants has run as high
as 40 per cent of the total payments.",,
The plan, however, suffers from several congenital defects.
First, by reason of the diversity of the various State laws, it often
entails the procurement of information for the liable State which
is not necessary in the agent State. This tends to encourage corres-
pondence and consequent delay.10 Second, in practice, the adminis-
tration of interstate claims has not been as expeditious as that of
intrastate claims,
Various proposals have been offered in an attempt to reduce
the correspondence and the delay in the payment of interstate bene-
fits which have, so far, attended the plan. Essentially, such pro-
posals were intended to obviate the necessity for special treatment
of interstate claimants and were based on the application, to a
greater or less degree, of an agent State's law to an interstate claim.
The proposal now embodied in the Interstate Arrangement was
finally selected" and the Arrangement went into effect in January
1947 after it had been accepted by 7 State agencies.
I Whether Congressional consent has been given for such agreements is dis-
cussed at page 140 et seq.
o Issues in Social Security, A Report to the Committee on Ways and Means,
7.9th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946) p. 715. For a further discussion of the Interstate
Bnefit Payment Plan and its operations see: Geddes and Russell, Interstate
Workers Under Unemployment Compensation in New England, 28 Am. LAB.
LuG. RLv. 59; Note, The Interstate Problems of the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Program, 36 ILL. L. Rkv. 862 (1942).
" Considerable difficulty has been encountered in the preparation of claim
forms, but this aspect seems to be well underway to solution with the adoption
of uniform claim forms which are finding rather general acceptance. Issues in
Social Security, Supra note 9.
, The other significant proposals which were rejected may be summarized
in broad terms as follows: 1. The agent State would make a recommendation
as to whether or not the claimant is available and has met the other eligibliity
requirements (presumably reporting and registration) set forth in its law.
If the agent State recommends payment of benefits on the basis of its law, the
liable State would be expected to base its determination on the recommendation.
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II. INTERSTATE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE DETERMINATION AND
PAYMENT OF INTERSTATE CLAIMS
The essence of the Interstate Arrangement is contained in the
following quotation from Article III:
C. Payment of Benefits; Liability, Conditions
Benefits shall be paid to an interstate claimant from the Un-
employment Fund of the paying State in the same manner
and under the same conditions as if such claimant were eli-
gile to receive benefits under the unemployment compensa-
tion law of such State, except that the amount of qualifying
wage credits required, his weekly rate or its equivalent, his
maximum benefit amount, his partial earnings limit, the sea-
sonal provisions applicable to him, the duration and the pe-
riod during which benefits are payable to him, the length of
his waiting period, and if the claim is the first one in his bene-
fit year, whether the claimant is otherwise currently eligible
for benefits and whether he is disqualified including the pe-
riod of any disqualification, shall be governed by the pro-
visions of the unemployment compensation law of the liable
State and shall be determined by the State agency adminis-
tering the unemployment compensation law of the liable
State. Provision [s] of the unemployment compensation law
of the paying State shall otherwise apply to an interstate
claimant."'
Stated simply, the Arrangement proposes that when a person
who is entitled to unemployment compensation under the law of
State A, files a claim in State B, the latter State will forward the
claim to State A for an initial determination of the amount and
duration of benefits and of the claimant's right to benefits, if this
determination has not already been made. Thereafter, State B will
treat claims for weekly benefits as though they were intrastate
claims subject to the eligibility and disqualification provisions of its
If the agent State recommends denial of payment, the liable State would make
a determination under 'ts own law on the basis of the facts obtained by the agent
State. 2. The liable State would transfer all wage credits to the State where
claimant files his initial claim; the agent State would make the initial deter-
ruination under its benefit formula applying its own eligibility and disqualifi-
cation provisions. The liable State would reimburse the agent State for all
benefits paid. Proposal 1, it may be noted, would still include the elements of
the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan which have been criticized; i.e., the hand-
ling of intrastate and interstate claims on a different basis and the necessity for
the forwarding of facts and weekly claims to the paying State before payment
can be made.
"Paying State" is defined in article III, A.3. of the Arrangement as "a
participating State in which a claim has been filed"; article III. A.4. defines
"Liable State" as "a participating State under whose unemployment compensa-
tion law an interstate claimant is currently eligible to receive benefits at the
time he files a claim in another participating State." A participating State
means a State which has accepted the arrangement. (article III. A.1.). The
paying State is reimbursed by the liable State on a quarterly basis. (article
III. E.).
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own law. It will be readily observed that this procedure eliminates
the need for weekly communications between the States, and per-
mits an interstate claim to be treated with as much dispatch as an
intrastate claim after the initial stage has been passed.
Whether or not the Interstate Arrangement is a legally auth-
orized method for the payment of benefits to interstate workers
requires consideration of the following questions:
1. Is a State unemployment compensation agency, authorized
under the law establishing it, to enter into an interstate arrange-
ment which would apply the eligibility and disqualification pro-
visions of another State's unemployment compensation law to inter-
state claimants whose rights to benefits have been established
under its own law?
2. Has Congress given its consent to interstate agreements in
the field of unemployment compensation?
3. Does the Interstate Arrangement violate the Fourteenth
Amendment?
1. The Legal Basis in Unemployment Compensation Laws for
Participation by State Agencies in the Arrangement.
At first it might seem that the situation presents many ana-
logies to a conflict of laws problem. We have a "right" created
under the laws of one State sought to be enforced under the laws
of another State. But under the unemployment compensation law
the claimant has no "right" against the employer and, although
it is true that he has a right against the agency for the payment
of his benefits once he has complied with the requirements for such
payment, such right can be enforced only in the manner and before
the particular tribunal established by State law and applicable
regulation. It is not a right which can be enforced by the courts
of another State. In view of the difference in the nature of the
rights in question, it would seem that concepts arising out of con-
flicts of laws involving private rights would not be relevant here.
The consideration of the problem at hand, therefore, must
proceed on the basis of the legality of the proposal measured
against the existing and applicable State and Federal law.
A. Statutory Authorization
In general, the State law provisions considered to authorize
participation in the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan and the
Arrangement, read as follows:
(a) The Commissioner is hereby authorized to enter into
arrangements with the appropriate agencies of other States
or the Federal Government whereby:
(2) Potential rights to benefits accumulated under the
unemployment compensation laws of one or more States or
under one or more such laws of the Federal Government, or
both, may constitute the basis for the payment of benefits
[Vol. 10
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through a single appropriate agency under terms which the
commissioner finds will be fair and reasonable as to all
affected interests and will not result in any substantial loss
to the fund;
(3) Wages or services, upon the basis of which an indi-
vidual may become entitled to benefits under an unemploy-
ment compensation law of another State or of the Federal
Government, shall be deemed to be wages for insured work
for the purpose of determining his rights to benefits under
this Act, and wages for insured work, on the basis of which
an individual may become entitled to benefits under this Act
shall be deemed to be wages or services on the basis of which
unemployment compensation under such law of another
State or of the Federal Government is payable, but no such
arrangement shall be entered into unless it contains pro-
visions for reimbursements to the fund for such of the bene-
fits paid under this Act upon the basis of such wages or
services, and provisions for reimbursement from the fund for
such of the compensation paid under such other law upon the
basis of wages for insured work, as the commissioner finds
will be fair and reasonable as to all affected interests; . . .
Subsection (a) (2) authorizes the State where the wages were
earned (liable State) and the State where the worker files a claim
for benefits (the agent or filing State) to enter into agreement
whereby the filing State acts as an agent of the liable State in the
payment of benefits, the right to such benefits presumably being
determined under the laws of the liable State, although the section
is silent on this point. It may be urged that the words "under terms
which the commissioner finds will be fair and reasonable as to all
affected interests" invest the commissioner with the authority to
enter into an agreement which results in the application of some of
the provisions of the filing State's law. Such an argument is not
without reasonable basis.
If it had been meant to limit cooperation under subsection
(a) (2) merely to procedures, the requirement that the "terms" be
"fair and reasonable as to all affected interests and will not result
in any substantial loss to the fund" might be viewed as unneces-
sarily cautious, if not surplusage. However, if "terms" be construed
to mean the imposition of conditions relative to the entitlement to
and the payment and amount of benefits, then these safeguards are
relevant and pertinent, and the protection of the fund against sub-
stantial loss is an important consideration. So viewed, the statute
would seem to provide an adequate standard for the administrative
action contemplated. 3
Cf. 1 SUTHERLrND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, (3d ed. Horack 1943), Sec-
tion 314 where it is stated: "Where . . .frequent adjustment or detailed ex-
pert knowledge of the field is necessary, a legislative delegation with general
policy standards is valid. The validity of a particular standard therefore, de-
pends primarily on the field of activity regulated. Thus in the field of public
19491
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An alternative basis for the Arrangement may be found in
subsection (a) (3) above. That subsection seems to contemplate
that the filing State will act as a principal, accepting the wages
earned in another State as wages under its law for the purpose of
determining an individual's "rights to benefits" under the filing
State's own law. The question now facing us is whether this lan-
guage admits of a determination, initial or otherwise, by the liable
State. It may be conceded that the section does not specifically
prohibit such a determination. The term "rights to benefits" might
be considered as meaning, in such case, rights to payments under
the law of the agent State even though the benefit amount is fixed
in another State. If the filing State accepts the wages earned in the
liable State, and considers that the incidents of the initial deter-
mination may legally be accepted by it under a provision similar to
subsection (a) (2), there is little basis for objection at this stage
by the claimant. The liable State is, by an agreement under sub-
section (a) (2), protecting and stabilizing the benefit rate of the
claimant. As to the filing State, it can fairly be said that the method
of computation is reasonably a subject of administrative agreement
since the amount of benefits paid will be the subject of reimburse-
ment by the transferring State and no loss can result to its fund.
The argument might, however, be made that to permit the com-
missioner to incorporate into the State law, under the guise of a
reciprocal arrangement under either subsection (a) (2) or (3)
above, conditions of eligibility and disqualification of another State's
law, would be a usurpation of the functions of the legislature. This
view would presumably be based on the principle that an adminis-
trative agency cannot by rules, regulations or agreements alter the
basic law under which it operates. The resolution of these opposing
positions hinges, of course, on the meaning accorded the applicable
statutory provisions and to what extent the arrangement is deemed
a proper subject for administrative action13 a
health, safety, and morals, general and indeterminative standards of policy
have usually been sustained and wide discretion has been left to administration.
Likewise, where the delegation involves the regulation of monopolies and busi-
nesses affected with a public interest, such general terms as 'reasonable' and
'public convenience, interest or necessity' have been held sufficiently concise
standards." Moreover, the granting of broad powers in connection with the
expenditure of public funds is not novel and has been recognized and upheld by
the courts as not constituting an invalid delegation of legislative power. People
v. Tremaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 168 N.E. 217 (1929) ; Bonsteel v. Allen, 83 Fla. 214,
91 So. 104 (1922) ; Abbott v. Commissioners, 160 Ga. 657, 129 S.E. 38 (1925) ;
Edwards v. Childer, 102 0kla. 158, 228 Pac. 472 (1924); Holmes v. Olcott, 96
Ore. 33, 189 Pac. 202 (1920) ; State v. Zimmerman, 183 Wis. 132, 197 N.W. 823
(1924); U.S. v. Hanson, 167 Fed. 881 (9th Cir. 1909). Cf. Butte City Water
Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905).
"I During the 1949 legislative sessions, several States have adopted legis-
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B. Does the Statute Permit an Invalid Delegation of Legislative
Power
It may, however, be argued that even if subsections (a) (2) and
(3) be interpreted as authorizing reciprocal arrangements which
impose different conditions on an interstate claimant, as compared
to an intrastate claimant, both the subsections and the agreements
here contemplated, insofar as they purport to adopt or to authorize
the adoption of prospective legislation of another State, would cOn-
stitute an invalid delegation of legislative power. The obvious
answer is that the agreements need not adopt prospective legis-
lation to achieve the desired result and may be limited to existing
legislation, as hereinafter pointed out in more detail. It might,
however, be pertinent at this point to consider the problem pre-
sented by the adoption of the law of another State.
The general view regarding the delegation of legislative power
involved in the adoption of the statutes of another State or of
Congress may be stated as follows:
Such adoption . . . is almost universally sustained when
the foreign law as then existing is adopted as the law of the
adopting State. Where the local legislation is contingent
upon the enactment of a statute of another State or of Con-
gress, some courts have held the statutes invalid. And more
have held the adoption of prospective legislation in other
States and in Congress as unconstitutional delegation. But
the better view favors the validity of the statute in all three
circumstances., '-
lation designed to furnish a clear statutory basis for the Arrangement. For
example, in Washington, section 44 of the Washington Unemployment Com-
pensation Act (Chapter 35, Laws of 1945, Section 9998-182, Remington's Re-
vised Statutes, 1945 supp.) was amended by H.B. 487, L. 1949, to read in part
as follows: "The Commissioner may enter into agreement with any other state
whereby in the event an individual files a claim in another state against wages
earned in employment in this state . . . the claim will be paid by this state or
another state as designated by the agreement in accordance with a determina-
tion on the claim as provided by the agreement and pursuant to the qualifica-
tion and disqualification provisions of this act or under the provisions of the
law of the designated paying state (including another state) or under such
combination of the provisions of both laws as shall be determined by the Corm.
,lssioner as being fair and reasonable to all affected interests." (Amendatory
language italicized.) The Nebraska Employment Security Law (section
48-601 et seq., Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1947 supp.) was similarly
amended by L.B. 125, L. 1949, as follows: "Sec. 48-668(1) . . . (c) Potential
rights to benefits under the provisions of sections 48-601 to 48-668 may con-
stitute the basis for payment of benefits by another state or the Federal Gov-
ernment . . . Such benefits shall be paid under such provisions of sections
48-601 to 4S-668 or under the provisions of the law of such state or the Fed-.
eral Government or under such combination of the provisions of both, laws, as
iw.y be agreed vpon as being fair and reasonable to all affected interests."
(Italics indicate amendatory matter.)
"1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION 68 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
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If subsections (2) and (3) and the agreements contemplated
by the Arrangement are viewed as adopting prospective legislation
of another State, there would be, as indicated in the above quotation,
serious question as to their validity. Although an examination of
the cases in the various States indicates a diversity of opinion on
the subject, it appears to be the prevailing view in most jurisdic-
tions that the adoption of prospective legislation or administrative
rules of another State, or of the Federal Government, constitutes an
invalid delegation of legislative power. 15 Several cases which
exemplify this diversity of opinion are briefly set forth below.16
'In re Opinion of Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453 (1921); State v.
Intoxicating Liquors, 121 Me. 438, 117 Atl. 588 (1922) ; State v. Gauthier, 121
Me. 522, 118 Atl. 380 (192?) ; Holgate Bros Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 Atl.
672 (1938); Smithberger v. Banning, 262 N.W. 492 (Neb. 1935); Cf. State v.
Webber, 125 Me. 319, 133 Atl. 738 (1926). This prevailing view has been
criticized by several leading students of the subject. See Mermin, Cooperative
Federalism Again: State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of
Existing and Future Federal Requirements. 57 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1947).
"An ordinance of the City of Detroit making it an offense to sell a com-
modity rationed by a Federal order or regulation without taking in exchange
required coupons, or to sell such rationed commodities at a price in excess of
ceiling prices, was held not to constitute an invalid "delegation of legislative
authority" to an agency of the Federal Government. People v. Sell, 310 Mich.
305, 17 N.W. 2d 193 (1945). A similar ordinance of the City of Cleveland was
held to be an invalid delegation. City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144,
60 N.E. 2d 919 (1945).
In Ex Parte Lasswell, 36 P. 2d 678 (Cal. 1934) a State Industrial Recovery
Act providing for adoption of industry codes to be promulgated by Federal
authorities was sustained. In New York, a similar statute was held to be an
invalid delegation of legislative authority, Daweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290,
196 N.E. 61 (1935). The New York Court of Appeals had previously sanc-
tioned legislation which taxed foreign corporations seeking to do business in
New York the same amount as that which the States that created them imposed
on New York corporations, People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 92 N.Y.
311, 44 Am. Rep. 380 (1883); and had sustained against a similar attack a
statute taxing persons, firms and corporations coming into competition with the
business of national banks, which business might be enlarged or diminished by
act of Congress. People ex rel Pratt v. Goldfogle, 242 N.Y. 277, 151 N.E. 452
(1926). Some State unemployment compensation acts contain a provision read-
ing substantially as follows: "The term 'employment' shall not include . . . any
service not included as 'employment' under Title IX of the Social Security Act."
Such a provision it was held, although proper as to existing legislation and
rulings, would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power if inter-
preted to permit the adoption in advance of any Federal act or any Federal
ruling that might be passed or made in the future. Colony Town Club v.
Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, 301 Mich. 107, 3 N.W. 2d
28 (1942); Minor Walton Bean Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation
Commission, 308 Mich. 636, 14 N.W. 2d 524 (1944); Florida Industrial Com-
mission v. State, 21 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1945). But a section in the California
law which provided for an exemption where the services are performed "in the
employ of a non-profit organization or corporation . . .where none of the fore-
going corporations or organizations is subject to a tax under Title IX of the
[Vol. 10
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It is unnecessary, however, to resolve the question of whether a
State may adopt in futuro legislation of another jurisdiction in
order to sustain the Arrangement.
Much of the objection to the Arrangement stems from the view
that the "adoption of another State's law" (whether existing or
prospective) for the purpose of determining certain claims, is
somehow a surrender of sovereignty. But this argument is pri-
marily over nomenclature, for use of the term "another State's
law," would seem to imply that legislative action is required to
achieve the result desired, whereas if the standard for the deter-
mination of an interstate claim be called "terms," a great deal of
the force of the argument is dispelled. Moreover, it was a sovereign
legislature which, by enacting provisions similar to section (a) (2)
vested power in the commissioner to impose upon an interstate
claimant terms which are measured by the legislative standard that
they be "fair and reasonable as to all affected interests and will not
result in any substantial loss to the fund." Such terms may be
established independently of the law of another State. In view
of the claimant's absence from the liable State, the commissioner
(in the exercise of the power delegated by the legislature) may find
that cleamant's eligibility cannot be determined effectively by the
test in use for an intrastate claimant. If he then may, by agreement
with another State, impose additional requirements, the mere fact
that the language of the law of such other State is employed in
stating these requirements is a mere coincidence and does not
change the agreement-it is still an administrative arrangement.
In order to determine the terms of the agreement, it may be neces-
sary to refer to the laws of another State, but such law is an
ex-rinsic factor, and the commissioner has not surrendered to the
legislature of another State the power to determine the terms under
which an interstate claim is to be paid. While a change in the
agreement may follow from a change in the law, the subject is still
the commissioner's to determine, and the agreement represents such
determination. Any effect the law of another State may have on
an interstate claimant is derived, not from its status as a legis-
lative enactment, but from the fact that the substance of such law
has become the "terms" agreed on by the commissioner. Although
the "terms" are thereby made identical with the agent State's law,
the fact remains that the claimant is affected by the conditions of
the agreement and not by the laws of another State.17
But even if an agreement be considered to adopt another State's
Social Security Act," was sustained without any qualification. Scripps Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. California Employment Commission, 151 P. 2d 109 (Calif.
1944).
1 If the agreement among the participating States were to incorporate the
provisions of the various laws which are to be made applicable to interstate
1949]
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law, it need adopt only existing State law, which, under the general
rule expressed above, is proper. In the event of a change in the law
of one participating State, the amendment could be agreed to by the
other States and evidence of such assent made part of the individual
agreements. Of course, this necessarily implies that the commis-
sioner may, if he believes the amendments fall short of fair and
reasonable terms, refuse to renew the agreement and instead may
make a substitute arrangement such as the Interstate Benefit Pay-
ment Plan now in operation or whatever other plan may be avail-
able.1-8 Thus the charge could not be made that the agreemeht
requires the Commissioner to adopt prospective legislation.19
In Hutchins v. Mayo,20 a State statute, regulating the citrus
fruit industry and providing that fruit should be graded according
to standards established from time to time by the State commission,
or, at the option of the shipper, according to the standards "as now
fixed by the United States Department of Agriculture or as such
standards may be hereafter modified or changed," was held to
delegate legislative power unlawfully in that it extended the option
beyond the existing Federal standards. 21 The court said, and the
language would seem applicable -to the problem here considered:
Again the question of delegation of power arises, this time
by the State legislature to the federal bureau. We do not
question the authority of the legislature to make optional
the regulations of the latter as they then existed but rules
therafter adopted by this [federal] agency could not be made
effective unless subsequently accepted by the commission in
whom such power was reposed by the state legislative body.
There should be secured to the state commission the power
to fix and enforce its own rules. If wisdom dictates the adop-
claimants, their use as "terms," as opposed to an "'adoption of the law of
another State" would be more readily apparent.
The Arrangement makes no specific provision as to the effect of a change
in the law of any of the participating States although under Article II of the
Arrangement, "any State accepting the Arrangement may cease to participate
by filing notice with the chairman of the committee. Its participation shall
cease at the expiration of three months from the date of filing such notice."
An example of an appropriate provision for this purpose is contained in the
amendment to the Nebraska law made by L.B. 125, L. 1949 (see footnote 13),
which added the following paragraph to the section on reciprocal agreements
of the Nebraska Employment Security Law:
"Sec. 48-668 ...
"(2) If after entering into an arrangement provided by this section the
Commissioner finds that the employment security law of any state or of the
federal government participating in such arrangement has been changed in a
material respect, the Commissioner shall make a new finding as to whether
such arrangement shall be continued with such state or with the federal
government."
Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 Atl. 672 (1938).
143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940).
But see People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W. 2d 193, 199 (1945).
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tion from time to time of those of the federal agency the
practical result will be precisely the same but we feel that
at all times the power granted in the act should be exercised
by the state commission.22
Thus, a commission may be empowered, as under section (a) (2),
supra, to adopt the existing legislation of another State from time
to time, although if the same result were achieved by providing for
the adoption of such legislation in futuro, it would probably be held
to be an invalid delegation of legislative power.
The only case involving the validity of the Interstate Arrange-
ment so far reported, however, holds the Arrangement to be in-
valid.23 This decision, which was rendered by the California Unem-
ployment Insurance Appeals Board, an administrative tribunal,
concludes that "the Interstate Arrangement is invalid because it
is an attempt to delegate to the agency of another State powers
which have been given by the legislature of this State to the Cali-
fornia Department of Employment and because it is beyond the
authority to enter into reciprocal arrangements provided in section
56.5 of the Act."
The Board observed that section 56.5 (b) 'of the California Un-
employment Insurance Act 24 (substantially the same as subsection
(a) (2) quoted above at page 00) "confers upon the Department
[of Employment] authority to enter into agreements to simplify
procedures but not to alter fundamental rights of either claimants
or employers as the Arrangement does." With this view of the
limited authority granted to the Department, the Board's conclusion
is not surprising. However, in the opinion of the writer, this con-
struction of the statute is less reasonable than the broader construc-
tion suggested above.
The only element introduced by this case not heretofore con-
sidered is the effect of the Arrangement on employers. Under the
"Decisions holding that the prospective adoption of foreign legislation is
an invalid delegation of power seem particularly artificial in many situations
where, if the authority was delegated under proper standards to an adminis-
trative officer, he would in fact adopt legislation and administrative regulations
of other states or of the federal government." SUTHERLAND, op. Cit. SUpra,
note 14, § 310. The case discussed in the text illustrates this criticism. Cf.
Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 71 P. 2d 209 (1937) where the Cali-
fornia court sustained a law which in effect empowered the state director of
agTiculture to base the grant of licenses on the provisions of Federal regula-
tions. As the court pointed out (9 Cal. 2d 291, 298, 71 P. 2d 209, 213) the
California law involved "no autorzatic incorporation by reference of future
federal laws, but a declared policy of making our law correspond with Federal
regulation under circumstances set forth in our statute, and an adequate con-
stitutional means for carrying that policy into effect." (Emphasis supplied.)
2 C.C.H., Unemployment Ins. Serv. Calif., 1 8594 (Calif. Unemployment
Appeals Board Dec. No. 8709, Oct. 1948).
2' CAL. GEN. LAws act 8780 d (1944).
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system adopted by California to finance the payment of unemploy-
ment compensation, the amount of benefits paid to his employees is
a factor in determination of an employer's rate of contributions.2 5
The Board considered that the employer, accordingly, had a "funda-
mental right" conferred by the statute to have the claimant's right
to benefits determined under the California law. The Board failed
to recognize, however, that a right conferred by a statute may be
limited or curtailed in certain situations by the legislature. Thus,
the right to appeal to California administrative bodies granted to
employers by section 67 of the California law may, under section
56.5 (b) of the same law, be modified by the agency. Besides, the
employer has no standing to complain of any conditions the law
may impose 'on the payment of benefits; "the State is free to dis-
tribute the burden of a tax without regard to the particular purpose
for which it is to be used."2 6 To hold the Arrangement invalid
because it curtails (or enlarges) certain "rights" conferred by the
statute begs the question at issue-whether the statute authorizes
the administrative agency to affect such "rights" by reciprocal
agreements.
2. Has Congress Given Its Consent to Interstate Arrangements for
the Payment of Unemployment Compensation
Whether interstate compacts in the field of unemployment insur-
ance require Congressional consent for their validity2 7 has never
been decided.2 8 Assuming Congressional consent is required for
" For a discussion of the various methods of computing employers' unem-
ployment compensation contributions see Arnold, Experience Rating, 55 YALE
L.J. 218 (1945).
2 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525 (1937).
-"No State shall, without the consent of Congress . . .enter into any
agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power." U.S.
CONST., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
1 The distinction between interstate agreements which may be entered into
only with the approval of the national government and those which may be
legally consummated without congressional consent is far from clear and has
been the subject of considerable comment and speculation among law writers.
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in
Interstate Adjustment, 34 YALE L. J. 685 (1925) ; Bruce, The Compacts and
Agreements of States with One Another and wit& Foreign Powers, 2 MINN. L.
REv. 500 (1918); Dodd, Interstate Compacts, 70 U.S. L. REV. 557 (1936);
Clark, Interstate Compacts and Social Legislation, 50 PoL Sci. Q. 502 (19.35) ;
Weinfleld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by 'Agree-
ment or Compacts'?, 3 U. OF CHi. L. Ruv. 453 (1936). Cf. Massachusetts v.
Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 16 (1939) which involved a controversy over the enforce-
ment of the reciprocal provisions of the tax statutes of the two states. In com-
menting on the legal effect of such reciprocal statutes, the Supreme Court
observed: "But, apart from the fact that there is no agreement or compact
between the states having constitutional sanction, U.S.C.A. Const. Art I, sec. 10,
par. 3, the enactment by Missouri of the so-called reciprocal legislation cannot
be regarded as conferring upon Massachusetts any contractual right."
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these compacts, 2 the legislative history of the unemployment in-
surance provisions of the Social Security Act 0 reasonably supports
the view that implied Congressional consent to these agreements
has been given and with respect to the Arrangement under con-
sideration such consent may reasonably be said to have been given
in advance.
The Constitution does not state when the 'consent of Con-
gress' shall be given, whether it shall precede or may follow
the compact made, or whether it shall be expressed or may
be implied.31
Turing to the record of the hearing on the Economic Security
Act before the House Committee on Ways and Means3 2 and the
Senate Committee on Finance,3 we find that the problem of the
payment of benefits to interstate workers was clearly recognized.
The Report of the Committee on Economic Security (included in
the published records) states:
A federally administered system of unemployment com-
pensation is undoubtedly superior [to a cooperative Federal-
State system] in some respects, particularly in relation to
employees who move from State to State. This presents a
problem involved in State administration which we do not at
this time know how to solve, although we do not regard it as
insoluble and recommend that it should be made one of the
major subjects of study of the Federal administrative
agency2.4
The Report of the Advisory Council to the Committee on Eco-
nomic Security, which advocated the inclusion in the Federal Act
of standards as to details of State laws (a suggestion which was
not followed), listed as one of the items to be incorporated a state-
ment relating to the "interstate transfer of employees":
The principle should be recognized that employees who have
unused benefit credits should not lose those credits because
they change their employment from one State to another but
no entirely practical plan to carry out this principle has as
I Several writers have indicated that such consent is probably necessary.
Cook, The Bodies Administering Unemployment Compensation Laws 3 LAw &
CONTEUIP. PROB. 95, 99, n. 29 (1936); Note, The Interstate Problems of the
Unemployment Compensation Program, 36 ILL. L. Rv. 862, 867, n. 22; 870-
872 (1942).
'49 STAT. 626 (1935); 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1946); 53 STAT. 1378 (1939);
42 U.S.C. § 502, 503 (1946); 49 STAT. 639 (1935); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1102
(1946).
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893).
'Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 4120, 74th
Cong., 1st sess.
'Hearings before the Committee on Finance on S. 1130, 74th Cong., 1st
sess.
'Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, id, P. 31; Hearings
before Committee on Finance, id, p. 1323.
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yet been worked out. It is recommended that the Federal
administrative agency be given authority to promulgate
rules for carrying out the principle herein stated prior to the
time when benefits become actually payable.31.
A statement submitted by Dr. Eveline M. Burns of Columbia
University pointed out with marked prescience36 that:
Under the present bill, which visualizes 48 different schemes,
the only way to protect the rights of employees now in one
State and now in another, but working always in employ-
ment subject to the Act, is to provide for reciprocity agree-
ments between all the different funds. Should all States take
advantage of the opportunity to conduct experiments (on
which so much emphasis is placed by framers of the bill)
each State will have to conclude an agreement with all 47
others if mobile workers are to be assured full protection
of their accumulated rights.
This statement placed squarely before the committees the neces-
sity for interstate agreements to insure the payment of benefits to
interstate workers under the proposed bill and indicated that a
fair interpretation of the bill authorized such arrangements.
The choice before the committee was to recommend a bill which
"except for a few standards . . . necessary to render certain that
the State unemployment compensation laws are genuine unem-
ployment compensation acts and not merely relief measures . ..
left [the States] free to set up any unemployment compensation
system they wish, without dictation from Washington, ' '3 7 or to
recommend a Federal unemployment compensation system, or to
recommend a Federal law which would specify in detail the pro-
visions to be contained ih the State acts.38 The necessity for im-
mediate Federal action in the field, coupled with uncertainty as to
the most practical form of an unemployment compensation act, led
to the adoption of the first alternative mentioned, which permitted
and encouraged experimentation by the States. Against this back-
ground, it is not difficult to understand why a provision relating to
interstate arrangements, which would have required specific action
by the States, was not included in the statute.
Two model draft bills for State legislation presented to the
Senate Committee by the Committee on Economic Security, con-
tained identical sections entitled "Reciprocal Benefit Arrangements
with Other States," 9 which foreshadowed present provisions on the
'Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, id p. 886; Hearings
before Committee on Finance, id p. 230.
Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, id, p. 1095.
= SEN. REP. No. 661, 74th Cong. 1st sess., 13 (1935).
' Although various other formulae were offered, the three plans mentioned
appear to have been the major items under consideration.
"These sections read as follows: "The commission is hereby authorized,
subject to approval by the governor, to enter into reciprocal arrangements with
[Vol. 10
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subject and further spotlighted the question.
It is thus evident that the contemporary interpretation of the
proposed law visualized interstate arrangements as not only auth-
orized under it, but necessary to link the State unemployment com-
pensation laws into a unified system protecting the unemployed
workers of the country. In these circumstances, although no ex-
press approval is given to such arrangements in either of the com-
mittee reports, this silence is reasonably interpreted as a tacit
consent.
It may well be that neither the legislative committees nor the
proponents of the bill, as finally enacted, viewed these reciprocal
agreements as anything more than mere administrative arrange-
ments and, as such, not in the category of compacts subject to and
requiring Congressional consent. Nevertheless, the facts surround-
ing the passage of the legislation would seem to give adequate sup-
port to the contention that Congress intended that such arrange-
ments, whether compacts or not, might be entered into.
Moreover, subsequent Congressional action, taken with full
awareness of existing interstate arrangements, is consistent with
this view. It seems settled that implied consent of Congress to
an interstate compact may be derived from the subsequent actions
of that body.'"
the proper authorities, in the case of any other unemployment compensation
system established by any State law or by an act of Congress, as to persons who
have (after acquiring rights to benefits under this act or under such other
system) newly come under this act or under such other system, whereby such
benefits (or substantially equivalent benefits) shall be paid (or both paid and
financed) in whole or in part through (or by) the fund of the unemployment
compensation system newly applicable to such person. Such reciprocal arrange-
ments shall be adopted and published by the commission in the same manner
as its general rules.
"Note-The above section is designed to make possible reciprocal arrange-
ments whereby an employee will not lose his benefit rights if he moves from
one State to the other, or from employment covered by a direct act of Congress.
The wording should not be altered."
Hearings before Committee on Finance, id, pp. 606, 627. Additional refer-
ences to the problem presented by interstate workers which, though relevant,
are merely cumulative in effect follow: Paragraph I (4), memorandum sub-
mitted by Dr. Paul H. Douglas, Hearings before Committee on Ways and
Mean., p. 1086; Statement of Senator Wagner, Hearings before Committee on
Finance, p. 3; Statement of Professor Tyson, ibid., pp. 738, 742; Statement of
Helen M. Hall, ibid., p. 768; Statement of Charlton Ogburn, ibid., p. 775; State-
ment of Robert 0. Elbert, ibid., p. 827; Paragraph II (4), memorandum sub-
mitted by Dr. Paul H. Douglas, ibid., p. 894; Statement of Paul Kellog, ibid.,
p. 904; Editorial from The Washington Post, ibid., p. 1092.
" Story's Commentaries on the Constitution states (Sec. 1405): "But the
consent of Congress may also be implied; and indeed, is always to be implied
when Congress adopts the particular act by sanctioning its objects and aiding
in enforcing them."
In Virginia v. Tennessee supra note 27, the compact involved the adjust-
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That Congress was informed of the existence and progress of
interstate arrangements seems apparent. In the hearings on the
proposed Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act of 193841 the
Interstate Benefit Payment Plan. (as it then existed) was brought
to the attention of the Congressional Committees there concerned.
A press release of the Social Security Board, dated May 27, 1938,
and entitled "State Unemployment Insurance Agencies to Cooperate
in Paying Benefits to Multi-State Workers," was incorporated in
the hearings before the House Committee. 42 This release set forth
and discussed the operation of the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan
and listed the States which had agreed, as of that time, to partici-
pate in it. Other allusions were made to the existence of the Inter-
state Benefit Payment Plan during the hearings 43 and the legality
and validity of the agreements underlying the plan were apparently
accepted without question.
The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act,44 as finally adopted,
indicates that Congress approved interstate agreements as part of
the services and facilities to be utilized by the Railroad Retirement
Board45 .
meat of a boundary dispute between the two States and the Supreme Court
held that a consent by Congress to the compact, if needed, might be found in
its subsequent actions towards the States.
"The approval by Congress of the compact entered into between the States
upon their ratification of the action of their commissioners is fairly implied
from its subsequent legislation and proceedings. The line established was
treated by that body as the true boundary between the States in the assign-
ment of territory north of it as a portion of districts set apart for judicial and
revenue purposes in Virginia, and as included for which appointments were
to be made by federal authority in that State, and in the assignment of territory
south of it as a portion of districts set apart for judicial and revenue purposes
in Tennessee, and as included in territory in which federal elections were to be
held, and for which federal appointments were to be made for that State. Such
use of the territory on different sides of the boundary designated, in a single
instance would not, perhaps, be considered as absolute proof of the assent or
approval of Congress to the boundary line; but the exercise of jurisdiction by
Congress over the country as a part of Tennessee on one side, and as a part of
Virginia on the other, for a long succession of years, without question or dispute
from any quarter, furnishes as conclusive proof of assent to it by that body as
can usually be obtained from its most formal proceedings."
'Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 3rd. sess., on H.R. 10127;
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate,
75th Cong., 3rd. sess. on S. 3772.
'Hearings before the House Subcommittee, ibid., p. 226.
" Hearings before the House Subcommittee, ibid., pp. 24, 72, 121, 209; Hear-
ings ebfore the Senate Committee, ibid., pp. 119, 177. The report of the House
Committee (which was adopted by the Senate Committee) on the Railroad Un-
employment Insurance Act does not, however, mention the Interstate Benefit
Payment Plan.
" 60 STAT. 722, 45 U.S.C. § 351 (1946).
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While the silence of Congress in the circumstances above de-
scribed is evidence of its approval of interstate agreements, it is
not the only evidence we have of such approval. Perhaps the most
conclusive proof of Congressional consent is to be found in the
history of the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act. As
originally enacted,4 6 section 303 (a) (2) required as a condition of
approval for grants by the Social Security Board:
Payment of unemployment compensation solely through pub-
15 Section 325 (f) of the Railroad Retirement Act provides in part as follows:
"The Board may cooperate with or enter into agreement with the appropriate
agencies charged with the administration of State, Territorial, Federal, or
foreign unemployment-compensation laws or employment offices .... The Board
may enter also into agreements with any such agency, pursuant to which any
vizeiaployment benefits provided for by this chapter or any other unemployment
con pesation law, may be paid through a single agency to persons who have,
during the period on the basis of which eligibility for and duration of benefits
is determined under the law administered by such agency or under this chapter,
or both, performed services covered by one or more of such laws, or performed
services which constitute employment as defined in this chapter: Provided,
That the Board finds that any such agreement is fair and reasonable as to all
affected interests." (Emphasis supplied.)
The term "such laws" as employed in the phrase "performed services cov-
ered by one or more such laws" obviously refers to "any other compensation
law" which, in turn, may be defined in the language of the first sentence of
this subsection, as a "State, Territorial, Federal, or foreign unemployment
compensation law." There is nothing in the chapter which evinces the intention
to limit the meaning of "such laws" to any particular combination, and "one
or more such laws," then, may be a Federal and Territorial law; or a Federal
and State law or oie or nore State laws. If the services performed are covered
by more than one State law, it necessarily follows that the agency with which
the agreement is made, in order to have any interest in such services, must
have made a further agreement with such other State or States, regarding
these services. Such further agreement is, I think, necessarily implied by this
language. Whether the agreement between the States be termed a reciprocal
agreement, an arrangement or a compact is immaterial, for the point is that
Congress authorized the Railroad Retirement Board to enter an agreement
which had as one of its elements an existing interstate agreement. The inclu-
sion in the committee reports of a letter from Dr. Altmeyer addressed to the
House Committee, dated April 25, 1938, strengthens this conclusion. The letter
pointed out that "as regards the difficulties of the railroads reporting to 52
separate jurisdictions, it should be pointed out that under arrangements that
have been developed by the States and Territories, the employment of any
employee worhing in more than one State is credited to only one State. There-
fore, the railroad companies are required to pay taxes and report the employ-
ment of such a person to only one State. When such an employee becomes
unemployed, he may file his claim for unemployment compensation in only one
State and draw all his benefits from that State." The language of subsection
(f), quoted above, is calculated to permit States participating in such an
arrangement to utilize the Railroad Retirement Board's facilities for the pay-
ment of benefits due as a result of the operation of the arrangement.
' STAT. 626 (1935), 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1946).
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lic employment offices in the State or such other agencies as
the Board may approve. (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1939,47 section 303 (a) (2) was amended 48 by striking out the
words "in the State." Discussing this amendment, the committee
reports, 49 in identical language, stated:
The amendments made by this section to paragraph (s) (2)
. . . of Section 303 (a) of the Social Security Act . . . [is]
designed to make clear that . . . cooperative arrangements
may be made for payment of compensation (in the case of
workers who have moved from the State in which their com-
pensation rights were earned) by one State through employ-
ment offices in another State.50
Approval of interstate agreements here given is in broad terms,
and approaches the character of express approval.
3. Constitutional Implications of the Arrangement for Determina-
tion and Payment of Interstate Claims
Some question has been raised as to whether the Arrangement,
and the law authorizing it, violate the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.51 As one State Attorney General has
pointed out:
The first of these [questions] derives from the fact that
under the plan [Arrangement], after the initial determina-
" In its Second Atinual Report (1937) to Congress, the Social Security
Board, reporting on the progress of interstate arrangements, stated: "Plans
for the payment of benefits to workers who have accumulated rights to benefits
in more than one State have been worked out tentatively by a committee of the
Interstate Conference and the Board. It is hoped that an interstate compact
embodying these provisions may be adopted in time to go into effect when
benefit payments begin in a large number of States in January 1938." (p. 65.)
(Emphasis supplied.) If Congress had not hitherto been aware of the nature
of the interstate arrangements contemplated, the appellation "interstate com-
pact" applied to them should have been sufficient indication of the possible
necessity of Congressional consent for the validation of such arrangements.
The amendment to Section 302 (a) (2) was apparently intended to give such
consent.
4"53 STAT. 1378 (1939) ; 42. U.S.C. §§ 502, 503 (1946).
503 (1946).
19H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., Ist sess. 55 (1939). SEN. REP. No. 734,
76th Cong., 1st sess. 65 (1939).
"It is worthy of note that the Veterans' Administration has interpreted
Section 696 (f) (a) of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (58 Star. 295
(1944), 38 U.S.C. § 696 (1946), which permits the utilization of services and
facilities of State agencies, as an authorization by Congress to utilize the Inter-
state Benefit Payment Plan in the payment of allowances under that Act. In
providing for a transfer of claims between State agencies the pertinent regu-
lation, among other options, permits a veteran who has been receiving an allow-
ance and has moved to another jurisdiction, to continue his claim against the
original agency under the Interstate Benefit Payment Plan. (Sec. 12, Veterans'
Administration Instruction No. 1.)
"... nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST., Art. XIV.
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tion of eligibility for benefits, the law of the state where
claim is filed, as distinguished from the Florida laws, will
determine the continued right to benefits even though the
laws of such state covering eligibility for benefits after such
initial determination may be at distinct variance with, and
more lenient to the claimant, than provisions of Section
443.06, Florida Statutes, 1941, as amended, related to such
issues.
It would not seem necessary to point out the obvious consti-
tutional implications presented by the questions concerning
such plan mentioned above.52
As a converse to the situation envisaged in the above quotation,
an interstate claimant might, in a given factual situation, be denied
benefits under the law of the State where he files his claim for
unemployment compensation, although upon the same facts he
would have been entitled to benefits under the law of the State in
which his wages were earned. Different treatment would thus be
accorded intrastate and interstate claimants under the Arrangement.
The issue thus presented for consideration is whether a classi-
fication into intrastate claimant and interstate claimants, founded
upon a claimant's presence in or absence from the jurisdiction of
the liable State at the time he files a claim for unemployment com-
pensation, and the application of different eligibility and disquali-
fication provisions to the members of each of such classes constitutes
a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
It would seem well settled that there is no constitutional guar-
antee that all persons subject to a law will be treated in identical
fashion. As was said in Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving Distrit:53
Nor need we cite authority for the proposition that the 14th
amendment does not require the uniform application of legis-
lation to objects that are different where these differences
may be made the rational basis of legislative discrimination.
Thus, it has been held that the equal protection clause "only
prescribes that the law have the attribute of equality of operation
and equality of operation does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to their rela-
tions."54 Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment prescribe the factors
upon which a classification may rest.
Upon what differences or resemblances it [classification]
may be exercised depends necessarily upon the object in
view; may be narrow or wide according to that object. Red
Opinion of Attorney General, State of Florida, dated January 24, 1948.
274 U.S. 387, 891 (1927) ; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S.
63 (1915) ; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
" Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898). To
the same effect Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902); Mis-
souri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
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things may be associated by reason of their redness with
disregard of all other resemblances or of distinctions. Such
a classification would be logically appropriate. Apply it fur-
ther: Make a rule of conduct, depend on it and distinguish in
legislation between red-haired men and black-haired men
and the classification would immediately be seen to be wrong;
it would have only arbitrary relation to the purpose and
provisions of legislation. 5
Even if it be granted that the legislative judgment be disputable or
even that some injustice and inequity results from the State law, a
court will not hold the law invalid on these grounds. If authority
to deal with that at which the legislation is aimed exists, a classifi-
cation "may be harsh and oppressive, and yet be within the power
of the legislature."5 6 The courts are reluctant to invade the province
of legislative discretion in classifying the objects of legislation and
it has been held that if the classification is not palpably arbitrary
and is uniform within the class, although not scientific or logically
appropriate, it will be upheld.5 7
It is established that distinction in legislation is not arbi-
trary, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, and the existence of that state of facts at
the time the law was enacted must be assumed . . . and we
repeat, 'it may make discriminations if founded on distinc-
tions that we cannot pronounce unreasonable and purely
arbitrary.'58
A cursory examination of the various unemployment compensa-
tion laws reveals that all of them to a greater or lesser degree dis-
criminate against certain classifications of workers. For example,
a worker who has not earned qualifying wages is denied benefits.
Such a classification was sustained in Carmichael v. Southern Coal
& Coke Co.,5 0 where it was said:
In establishing a system of unemployment benefits the legis-
lature is not bound to occupy the whole field. It may strike at
the evil where it is most felt [citations], or where it is most
practicable to deal with it [citations]. It may exclude others
whose need is less [citations], or whose effective aid is at-
tended by inconvenience which is greater [citations].
Again, various State laws contain seasonal provisions which re-
strict the benefit rights of workers engaged in seasonal industries.
These classifications would seem to have been made upon a reason-
able basis and to bear some relation to the payment of unemploy-
Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 382 (1916).
Tanner v. Little, id. at 383.
' Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 513 (1916) ; Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912) ; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 235
(1911); Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 (1914).
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342 (1916).
301 U.S. 495, 519 (1937).
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ment compensation. A classification which is based on the juris-
diction where an individual files a claim for benefits and a dis-
crimination which consists of the application of the eligibility and
disqualification provisions of that jurisdiction to the claimant,
similarly would not constitute a denial of the equal protection of
the laws or an unreasonable discrimination. Essentially, the effect
of the classification into intrastate and interstate claimants is to
create a geographical classification which provides for the different
treatment of individuals within different localities. That such a
classification, of itself, is not invalid would seem clear. 60
Thus, it was contended that the Constitution and laws of Mis-
souri which provided that appeals from certain areas of the State
should be had only to certain courts violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court which
declared :,1
WVTe might go still further, and say, with undoubted truth,
that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any state
from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit
for all or any part of its territory. If the State of New York,
for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its
method of procedure for New York City and the surround-
ing counties, and the common law and its method of pro-
cedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the Con-
stitution of the United States to prevent its doing so. This
would not, of itself, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, be a denial to any person of the equal protection
of the laws. If every person residing or being in either por-
tion of the State should be accorded equal protection of the
laws prevailing there, he could not justly complain of a vio-
lation of the clause referred to. For, as before said, it has
respect to persons and classes of persons. It means that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protec-
tion of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and under like circumstances.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This doctrine was applied to an unemployment compensation
statute in Eldred v. Division of Employment Security6 by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. There the unemployment compensa-
tion statute, which created a geographical classification resulting
in the exclusion from unemployment benefits of workers employed
in certain localities, was upheld. The statute provided in substance
that services performed "outside of the corporate limits of a city,
village, or borough of 10,000 population or more" for an employer
"not subject to Title IX of the Federal Social Security Act" did
"Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving District, supra; Hayes v. Missouri, 120
U.S. 68 (1887); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884); Missouri v. Lewis,
101 U.S. 22 (1879).
M1issouri v .Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
2295 N.W. 412 (Minn. 1940).
19491
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
not constitute "employment" under the Minnesota unemployment
compensation law. Claimant who was denied benefits under these
provisions, attacked the statute as denying him the equal protec-
tion of the laws. Although the court questioned the right of the
plaintiff to raise a constitutional issue, in view of the fact that the
unemployment compensation law did not purport to confer any
vested rights, 3 it proceeded to determine the case on its merits,
and declared that the question facing it was "Does the quoted sec-
tion create an arbitrary class, thereby offending constitutional pro-
hibition against special legislation and inequalities?" This ques-
tion is the precise one that concerns us here and the court's reason-
ing in arriving at its conclusion that the law did not so offend
would seem to be applicable to the problem here considered. The
court noted that the act did not deal with personal or property
rights but was intended to operate exclusively in the field of social
welfare, and held that there were sufficient facts to afford a rea-
sonable basis for the classification. It was shown, first, that the
need for unemployment compensation was less in rural than in
urban centers and second, that the administrative expense in coun-
try districts was much higher than in city districts. "All these,"
the court said, "are factors which the legislature could well consider
as a basis for distinction and consequent differentiation in classi-
fication."
Although in Missouri v. Lewis, supra, Eldred v. Division, supra,
and the other cases cited on the point, the courts were considering
geographical classifications within the territorial jurisdiction of
a State, extension of the principles there enunciated to support
the classification into intrastate and interstate claimants, which
relates in part to areas outside the State, does not seem unreason-
able. Indeed, such an extension would seem to present an a fortiori
case since the basis of the classification is even clearer, and would
appear even less arbitrary.
I Section 1603 (a) (6) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 53 Stat. 185,
requires that a State law, to obtain approval by the Board, must contain, among
other things, a provision that "all the rights, privileges o rimmunities conferred
by such law or by acts done pursuant thereto shall exist subject to the power
of the legislature to amend or repeal such law at any time." All the State
unemployment compensation laws contain such a section.
In the following cases it was held that unemployment compensation laws
did not confer vested rights which could not be affected by subsequent legis-
lation.
Moore v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 73 Ohio App. 362, 56
N.E. 2d 520 (1943); Shelley v. National Carbon Co:, 285 Ky. 502, 148 S.W. 2d
686 (1941); Talley v. Unemployment Compensation Division of Ind. Acc. Bd.,
63 Idaho 644, 124 P. 2d 784 (1942); Crosset Lumber Co. v. McCain, 170 S.W.




That the distinction between an intrastate claimant and an
interstate claimant is not an arbitrary or fanciful one is apparent
even from a superficial examination. In order to make possible the
payment of interstate benefits, special procedures must be created
and the administrative facilities of another State must be utilized.
Added to these factors is the consideration that an interstate
claimant is attaching himself to the labor force in another State
where different conditions may prevail. These elements would seem
more than enough to remove the classification from the category of
"unreasonable and purely arbitrary distinctions."1"
In the case of an interstate claimant, then, the argument that
the payment of benefits to him is administratively more burden-
some and more expensive than payment to an intrastate claimant
and that considerable difficulty is entailed in securing facts neces-
sary for determinations of eligibility and disqualification from an-
other State, would seem to be reasonable and to justify the dis-
tinction. The interstate claimant is not being denied the equal
protection of the laws; all interstate claimants in the State where
he files his claim are subject to the same laws, and these laws are
also applicable to other individuals in the same area. The legisla-
ture may deem it advisable, and it cannot be said that this action
is unreasonable, to provide that if an individual goes to another
State and, by filing a claim for unemployment compensation, indi-
cates his intention to become part of the labor force in that State,
that his entitlement to benefits shall be governed by the eligibility
and disqualification provisions applicable to other members of the
same labor force.
It is worthy of note that the interstate claimant is not bound
permanently by the classification; he has the right to return to
the liable State and have his right to benefits determined under its
laws. It is his voluntary act which brings the eligibility and dis-
qualification provisions of another State's law into operation. Al-
though it is admitted that economic necessity may determine the
State in which a claimant files for benefits, nevertheless, the law
does not dictate where the claim shall be filed. Theoretically the
claimant is free to select the State in which he shall file and its
law may be more favorable to him than that of the liable State.
No compulsion is exercised by the statute and the claimant may
freely change his selection.
The State may further argue that it is under no obligation to
accept claims filed outside of its jurisdiction.6 In permitting a
claimant to file outside of its jurisdiction, therefore, the State may
" DEnver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913) ; Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
1 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Eldred v.
Division of Employment Security, 295 N.W. 412 (Minn. 1940).
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impose additional or different eligibility conditions upon such a
claimant which, if applicable to the class of interstate claimants
"in the same place and under like circumstances," do not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. As already indicated, the legislature
may make discriminations if founded on distinctions that are not
unreasonable or purely arbitrary, and absence from the jurisdiction
of the person or thing dealt with by legislation has been held to
provide a reasonable basis for classification.6
Finally, it may be pointed out that the statute authorizing the
Interstate Arrangement would find support in the general rule
that every presumption should be indulged in favor of the con-
stitutionality of particular legislation, 67 and the burden is upon one
claiming the contrary to show clearly and beyond reasonable dis-
pute that its provisions are repugnant to the Constitution. 8  It is
indeed doubtful that a claimant attacking the statute could sustain
this burden.
' Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) ; Central Loan & Trust Co. v. Campbell, 173 U.S.
84 (1899); Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.S. 618 (1904); Douglas v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
In the Hammond Packing Co. case, a statute which established a procedure
for the examination of books and papers outside the State in the course of
litigation was sustained and the Court said (page 349): "The contention that
because § 8 applies only to books and papers outside of the State, therefore it
denies the equal protection of the laws is not open, since it has been conclusively
settled that, without denying the equal protection of the laws, relations may be
based upon the fact that persons or property dealt with are not within the
territorial jurisdiction of the regulating authority."
Similarly, in Madden v. Kentucky, where the validity of a Kentucky statute,
which imposed on its citizens an annual and ad valorem tax on their deposits in
banks outside of the State at the rate of 50 cents per hundred dollars while
deposits in banks located within the State were taxed at the rate of 10 cents
per hundred dollars, was in question, the Supreme Court held that the classifi-
cation was reasonable and did not deny plaintiff equal protection or due process
of law. It was pointed out that the difficulty of collecting a tax on deposits
outside the State could justify the classification and that, "the treatment
accorded the two kinds of deposits may have resulted from the differences in
the difficulties and expenses of tax collection."
"Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908);
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944); Davis v. Department of
Labor and Industries, 317 U. S. 249 (1942).
' New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682
(1930); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1938).
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